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Abstract
Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial prop-
ositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this 
way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the 
apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philoso-
phers object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the 
fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do 
for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no 
different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called. 
They conclude that it is subject to the norms applicable to paradigmatic 
empirical beliefs, and hence, pace fictionalists, ontological commit-
ments must be taken seriously. I disentangle three strands in the objec-
tor’s thought: the ‘What more can you ask for?’ intuition, a linguistic/
conceptual claim, and a claim about norms. I argue that the former 
two are compatible with ontological deflationism, and therefore do not 
entail applicability of the norms. Nevertheless, if indeed there is no 
more robust acceptance with which to contrast the supposed nonseri-
ous acceptance, then the fictionalist’s claim to austere ontology must 
be abandoned. Is there a reason to suppose there is any merit to the 
distinction-without-a-difference charge? I argue that there is, clarify it, 
and defend against objections, focusing on Daly 2008.
Keywords
Fictionalism, ontological deflationism, doublethink, make-believe, 
nonserious acceptance.
Inga Nayding2
I
1 Fictionalism: two kinds of appeal
Fictionalists claim that while they do not believe certain contro-
versial propositions, for example, those entailing the existence of 
numbers, they accept them as useful make-believe. The attraction 
of fictionalism is not merely that it promises to make life easy by al-
lowing you to disavow apparent existential commitments of theories 
you use. Its attraction is also in validating certain intuitions, such as 
that there is something wrong with seeing one’s acceptance of the 
existence of numbers as answerable to reality in any way whatsoever, 
with being troubled by their “strangeness”, or with being concerned 
about the lack of epistemic access to them. Fictionalism allows one 
to view the answers to such existential questions as ultimately within 
the purview of pragmatic reasons, beholden to nothing else. Accord-
ing to the fictionalist, the propositions we accept as mathematical 
truths should be seen as truths in a fiction, constrained only via the 
stipulations of this fiction. Those stipulations themselves, the source 
of basic ontological posits, either are or should be accepted as fic-
tion1—in a way that does not amount to belief, and hence not subject 
to evidential norms. This allows one to have an ontology one could 
be proud of and not to have to worry about being forced into onto-
logical commitments by the pressures of philosophical or scientific 
theorizing. The latter is important for those who are methodologi-
cally committed to viewing philosophy as continuous with science.
Some fictionalists might care more about the freedom to make 
existential claims as needed than about having an austere ontology. 
However, a view that completely abandons any claim to ontologi-
cal advantages, moving under the “ontology does not matter” tent, 
thereby ceases to deserve the name of fictionalism, and should be 
classified as ontological deflationism. In view of that, I shall under-
stand by ‘fictionalism’ a view that presupposes a contrast between 
1 ‘Are’ or ‘should be’ corresponding to the distinction between hermeneutic 
and revolutionary fictionalism, going back to Burgess (1983). This distinction 
will not play a significant role in the present discussion.
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serious and nonserious acceptance of the contents at issue. In other 
words, the fictionalist, to deserve the name, has to see herself as 
believing differently than the realist.
Although the prototype of the fictionalist’s nonserious accep-
tance is to be found in ordinary displays of make-believe, such as 
games, daydreaming, etc., the fictionalist needs to press such accep-
tance into much more onerous service than it is doing there. It can 
no longer be fleeting and situation-bound as we often find it in ev-
eryday make-believe. It must be a fairly stable, dispositional attitude 
towards certain contents. One is to rely on it whenever philosophical 
ontology is not squarely in one’s sights. There can be nothing like the 
amount of indeterminacy of literary fiction when it comes to what 
is true in the mathematical fiction. This, and not that, number is a 
solution to the equation, and therefore the need to accept that solu-
tion must be fully determined against the background of the relevant 
stipulations. The freedom, characteristic of make-believe, is to come 
only at the outmost “layer”, where we posit the existence of the rel-
evant kind, e. g., numbers, whereas the majority of specific math-
ematical acceptances appear to be no less constrained than specific 
ordinary beliefs. In this way, the fictionalist’s acceptance comes to 
seem increasingly like belief, which gives rise to the concern that it 
really is belief masquerading under another name and that fictional-
ists are engaged in doublethink.
There appears to be no consensus among the fictionalists on ex-
actly what must be done to deflect the charge of doublethink, and 
the tendency is towards doing increasingly less. Field claimed that 
mathematics’ conservativeness makes it “legitimate to introduce 
mathematics as an auxiliary device that aids us in drawing infer-
ences” (Field 1980: 2). Later, Yablo reasoned that if it is legitimate to 
claim the fictionalist attitude towards the deductively auxiliary, then it 
should also be legitimate to do so for the “representationally auxiliary” 
(Yablo 2005). If for Field the fictionalist had to isolate the content to 
which the fictionalist attitude is adopted, for Yablo what is put forth 
in full seriousness and what is a mere representational aid could be 
inextricably mixed (2001: 82; 2002: 299; 2008: 18). While Yablo 
himself makes a detailed case for regarding mathematical discourse 
as fictional, he also argues for the ubiquity of the fictional. However, 
if the fictional is as pervasive and ubiquitous as he alleges, one is left 
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to wonder whether in the future it would be necessary to defend the 
fictional construal of any discourse at all, i.e., whether such a con-
strual should not become the presumption.
2 A sham attitude?
The fictionalist makes apparently contradictory statements and 
claims that only one set of them expresses her true worldview. Her 
“true” ontology is austere, even as she makes all sorts of apparent 
ontological commitments when engaged in non-purely-ontological 
pursuits—pursuits that we would ordinarily count as serious, such 
as scientific research, rather than telling fairy tales to children.
There is the objector, whose intuition says that the fictionalist’s 
“nonserious acceptance” is sham. But the fictionalist responds: “How 
so? Surely, we all do sometimes hold a nonserious attitude towards 
a content; Quine admits as much himself;2 so, why should we labor 
under a self-imposed constraint that serves no worthwhile purpose?”
The objector counters along some such lines as these: “Yes, no 
doubt, we do sometimes hold a nonserious attitude, but in such cases 
the nonseriousness is constituted in such-and-such a way, i.e., it is this-
and-that that makes it the case that the attitude is nonserious, where-
as in what you are proposing this is absent. Hence, you are invoking a 
distinction without a difference. The demands put on the attitude by 
the role you require it to play make it impossible to construe it as non-
serious, make-believe, within-the-game acceptance. In no way does 
it fall short of serious acceptance. Hence your claim of nonserious-
ness is sham and your attitude is belief, plain and simple. That is why, 
when you turn around and deny what you have just said, and claim to 
have an austere ontology, you are nothing but a doublethinker. You 
ought to assume the responsibility that comes with believing.”
Leave blank for now the particular analysis of nonseriousness. 
There are three distinct strands of thought tangled up in the little 
speech that I have put in the objector’s mouth.
The first is that once you have accepted, say, the mathemati-
cal content, in the way in which the fictionalist proposes to accept 
it, there is nothing else for belief to be. You have done all you could 
2 Cf. Yablo 1998: 244-245.
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possibly do acceptance-wise. You could feel or fail to feel some in-
ner glow; you could make passionate inward affirmations—or not—
none of that is relevant, because none of that goes towards constitut-
ing belief. When it comes to what does constitute it, it is all there in 
the supposed nonserious acceptance, and therefore you make a ver-
bal distinction where there is none in nature. (Not a perfect analogy, 
but compare with the story about the “stone soup”: the trickster’s 
project to make stone soup gradually evolves, through addition of 
nutritious ingredients, to the point where you get something which 
is misdescribed as “stone soup”. By the time the fictionalist adds to 
everyday make-believe all that needs to be added, this is just plain 
belief, plus some irrelevant accompanying mental fluff.) The way to 
proceed from this intuition to something more solid is to show it 
entailed by an analysis of the distinction between seriousness and 
nonseriousness. We left that blank for generality’s sake.
This idea, that there is nothing that the supposed fictionalist ac-
ceptance falls short of, is the core of the objector’s thought—it is 
the doublethink charge proper. It is a thesis about the structure of our 
cognition. If true, the fictionalist’s claim to austere ontology cannot 
be sustained. The contradictory statements will not float by each 
other on different levels of seriousness as the view seems to envisage, 
but will clash head-on, so to speak. Note that the thesis is descriptive 
and not normative. Note also that it is substantive in the sense that it 
is not about how something well understood is best described.
The second thread is concerned with the latter. It proceeds from 
the doublethink thesis and concludes that, therefore, the would-be 
fictionalist acceptance must be classified as ‘belief’. This is a thesis 
about deserving a particular name. It is grounded in the idea that 
belief = full acceptance. It is a thesis about concepts. Its defense 
would have to come from the analysis of nonseriousness which we 
left blank.
The above is easily confused with the third thread: that the kind 
of acceptance that fictionalism requires, whatever we call it, is answer-
able to certain norms and that those norms prohibit the adoption of 
this attitude for pragmatic reasons. If this is right, the fictionalist is 
not free to posit whatever is convenient whenever convenient, and 
that defeats the point of fictionalism, making “Fictionalism is im-
possible” a fair assessment. This third point is crucial for those who 
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wish to insist on the importance of ontological commitments. The 
doublethink thesis is not sufficient for establishing that, as it is com-
patible with deflationism. A fictionalist who was persuaded by the 
doublethink charge could give up the idea of a contrast between the 
two attitudes, and with it the claim to an austere ontology, but in-
sist on freedom to accept certain existential statements as needed in 
science. (Thereby such a fictionalist would turn into a deflationist.)
To recap, in brief, these are three separate theses: (1) The envis-
aged fictionalist acceptance amounts to full acceptance of the rel-
evant content. In other words, nothing less than full acceptance will 
satisfy the demands fictionalism puts on the relevant acceptance at-
titude. (I call this ‘the doublethink thesis/charge/objection’.) (2) Full 
acceptance is belief. (3) Fictionalist acceptance is subject to certain 
norms, namely, the same norms as apply to paradigmatic cases of 
belief. What reason is there to hold (3)? Or rather, what reason is 
there to hold (3) that has anything to do with (1) and (2)? (If there is 
another reason, it is outside the scope of this paper.)
Perhaps one thinks: if full acceptance is belief, then it is subject 
to the norms that belief is subject to, and those, as we all know, are 
evidential norms. But certainly this is question-begging. If full ac-
ceptance deserves to be called ‘belief’ and it is a point of dispute just 
what norms full acceptance is answerable to, then it hardly helps to 
say that it is answerable to the norms that belief is answerable to. 
Those are ex hypothesi also in dispute. (The hypothesis here is that 
belief = full acceptance.)
Some philosophers think our concept of belief is normative, i.e., 
that it comes with a norm (or some norms) already in it.3 (I shall as-
sume these are the very same norms that generate the responsibility 
for ontology.) There is some supporting intuition in favor of this. If 
so, then indeed (1) and (2) would entail (3). But ‘full acceptance’ in 
(1) cannot be a normative notion, and hence, if ‘belief’ is normative, 
then (2) should be rejected. ‘Full acceptance’ in (1) cannot be norma-
tive because it aims to characterize acceptance as understood by the 
fictionalist, whereas the fictionalist cannot reasonably take it to be 
a normative notion. That is because the notion of seriousness at play 
cannot be normative. Suppose it were. Then the fictionalist who says, 
3 Shah 2003, Shah and Velleman 2005.
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“I am not committed to the truth of what I am asserting here because 
I am not being serious, because I put it forth in the spirit of make-
believe, etc.” would not be adverting to any psychological reality, but 
rather would be merely saying that she refuses to be answerable to 
the relevant norms. That would constitute coming full circle to the 
bad pre-Quinean days, when philosophers allegedly were given to 
saying things like, “In assessing my ontology, don’t count what I say 
there, count only what I say here,” and leaving it at that.
Let us then assume that ‘belief’ is not a normative concept and, 
for the sake of the argument, let us take (2) to be true. We can re-
turn to the question posed earlier: do (1) and (2) provide any kind of 
reason for (3)? My answer is “No”. It follows from what I have already 
said: (1) is compatible with deflationism, whereas (2) is simply a con-
ceptual or terminological claim that should not make a substantive 
difference.
3 Common confusions
Why does it seem that (3) follows? It could be that the use of ‘be-
lief’ is fluid and oscillates between a normative and a non-normative 
sense (as I suggested elsewhere 4). This could account for a slide from 
(1) and (2) to (3) through ambiguity in (2).
Alternatively, the confusion could stem from a misunderstand-
ing of the role of paradigmatic cases of belief for the issues at hand. 
This appears to be both widespread and pernicious and so deserves 
a somewhat extended discussion, which will take up the rest of this 
section.
There is a tendency to think that by pondering the clearest cases 
of belief (i.e., of full acceptance, as we agreed), one discovers the 
true nature of belief: in effect, its essence. Such paradigmatic cases 
are supposed to be the ordinary empirical beliefs. Their essence, let 
us suppose, somehow triggers the application of the relevant norms. 
One would need to conclude that this essence is present in any case 
of belief. It would not help to propose that ‘belief’ is a natural kind 
term for which the familiar empirical beliefs play the role of refer-
ence-fixing samples, that is, to think along the lines of the following. 
4 Nayding 2011.
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“We already found out what belief really is, just like we found out 
that water is H2O. Just as by conceding something is water, you are 
conceding that it is H2O, so by conceding an attitude is belief, you 
are conceding that it has an essence that makes it subject to those 
norms.” The mistake here is transparent: just as you should not con-
cede something is water unless you know it is H2O, so too, if you are 
committed to belief having a certain norm-triggering essence, you 
should not concede that an attitude is belief unless you ascertain its 
presence.
It might be said that, nevertheless, those clear cases create a pre-
sumption that the same norms apply: after all, why would not the 
same norms apply to the same kind of thing (i.e., to full acceptance, 
also known as belief)? This too is mistaken. Those clear cases might 
well co-instantiate several kinds, with the norms applying to one 
kind and not others. An analogy: perhaps the clearest cases of moral 
demands relate to objects that are both rational and capable of ex-
periencing pain. In order to project the norm to other cases, one 
must come to understand which kind is relevant: which one of these 
properties triggers the applicability of the norm.
It seems that when it comes to belief this simple point is obscured 
because one can discern but one relevant kind: belief. We should 
distinguish, however, the fullness of acceptance (i.e., there being 
nothing further that could be done acceptance-wise) and whatever 
this acceptance consists in. These could diverge. I will dwell on this 
a little.
Consider an analogy. It is possible for there to be norms that pre-
scribe conditionally on the absolute quantity of water in one’s posses-
sion, and it is possible for there to be norms that prescribe condition-
ally on the fullness of the glass. E.g., you might be required to share 
whenever you have 250 ml of water, because that is the absolute 
quantity of water you have, or you might be required to share when-
ever your glass is full, because of that very condition and regardless 
of the capacity of the glass. If you have a full glass containing 250 ml, 
you are required to share whichever of these possible norms is in fact 
the norm. However, it matters which of the two is the actual norm, 
because that determines what to expect in other cases. If fullness as 
such is what grounds the norm (i.e., is what figures in the content of 
the norm as the relevant condition), then ceteris paribus you have an 
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obligation when you have a smaller glass which is full with only 200 ml 
in it. Not so if the other possible norm is the actual norm. Vice versa, 
the norm based on the absolute quantity would create an obligation 
when you have 250 ml in a half-filled larger glass.
Similarly, it is possible that the norms applicable to full accep-
tance are predicated upon its fullness as such (i.e., upon there being 
nothing further to be done acceptance-wise) or that they are predi-
cated upon what the acceptance of the relevant content is in itself, 
i.e., upon what it consists in. Which of these possibilities obtains 
cannot be determined by pondering cases where either norm would 
apply, such as beliefs about ambient tables and chairs.
What do I mean by ‘acceptance as it is in itself’ or by ‘what it con-
sists in’? The idea is not that acceptance is something separable from 
the content that it is the acceptance of. On the contrary, I would like 
to underscore that acceptance is always acceptance-of-a-content. 
Nevertheless, there is something that this acceptance-of-a-content 
consists in for a given content. It is that which is to full acceptance 
of a given content as the absolute quantity of water is to its com-
pletely filling the glass. For example, if acceptance is a sui generis 
feeling, then it is that feeling. Perhaps it can vary in intensity, and 
then it could be that for one content the maximal reachable intensity 
is M, while for another it is N. Then acceptance of the same intensity 
could be maximal for one content and not for another. Alternatively, 
maybe acceptance consists in dispositions towards use. (I say ‘use’ 
in the most general sense, comprising mental use.) Likewise, then, 
such and such dispositions that go into acceptance of a given content 
C may or may not constitute the maximal, i.e., complete, acceptance 
of C.
It should be clear now that, depending on what grounds the 
norms (i.e., which properties of acceptance are implicated in the 
content of the norm: its completeness or something else), it may or 
may not be the case that the same norms apply to any acceptance that 
is, in the relevant sense, “complete”. Suppose acceptance is “use” (in 
some relevant sense), and suppose the content C1 lends itself to three 
kinds of use U1, U2, U3, while the content C2 lends itself to only one 
kind of use, U1. If the norms stem from completeness of acceptance 
vis-à-vis the kinds of use, then the same norms would apply to the 
full acceptance of C1 and C2. But if the norms stem from the kind of 
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use as such, then that might not be the case. Furthermore, it might 
then turn out that the same norms apply to C2 as to a partial accep-
tance of C1 (one comprising only U1).
A brief point of clarification. If acceptance consists in disposi-
tions to use, then there is a very finely grained notion where every 
content would have an individuating profile and there is also a very 
high-level description (‘act as if true’) which will be invariant across 
contents. I am suggesting that there may be an intermediate level 
where systematic differences could be discerned. For example, some 
contents can be incorporated into a “map” which is continuous with 
the map of our environment and thus ultimately with the sensory 
content,5 while others cannot be so incorporated (purely mathemati-
cal contents, for example). This incorporating presents a kind of use 
that appears to be available for some contents and not for others. In 
this way, it is prima facie possible that different norms apply to full 
acceptance of such contents than to full acceptance of other kinds of 
contents.
To sum up, the claim that full acceptance deserves to be called 
‘belief’ should not lead one to conclude that full acceptance is always 
subject to the norms that apply to it in a range of familiar cases of be-
lief/full acceptance, specifically, evidential norms or norms requir-
ing parsimony of existential posits. Therefore, the fictionalist who 
is more of a deflationist at heart—one who cares primarily about 
validating the intuition that there is something wrong with taking 
ontology seriously—can maintain that part of the view while grant-
ing to the objector that the acceptance of the relevant contents does 
not contrast with any more robust acceptance and hence giving up 
the insistence that she really is ontologically austere.
Of course, the mere fact that one could concede something is no 
reason to think one should. Is the doublethink objection anything 
for the fictionalist to worry about? I cannot give this subject an ex-
haustive treatment, but I would like to discuss Daly 2008, since it is 
often thought to have dispatched the doublethink worry. Daly does 
not endorse fictionalism, rather, he defends it from this objection to 
press another, but the latter will not concern me. The discussion will 
serve to illustrate several common misconceptions. I will then try 
5 I am alluding, of course, to the treatment of belief in Armstrong 1973.
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to improve on the presentation of the doublethink charge to prevent 
such misconceptions.
II
1 Daly 2008 – summary of the argument
Daly starts by summing up his understanding of fictionalism as the 
proposal to “exploit” rather than to believe the relevant proposition. 
He underscores that instead of believing some proposition P the fic-
tionalist merely believes it to be useful. Daly then approaches the 
doublethink worry via a passage from O’Leary-Hawthorn (1994) 
where the latter points out that the fictionalist’s characterization of 
the would-be fictionalist attitude coincides with the usual charac-
terization of belief. Having objected to what looks like a behaviorist 
take on that characterization, Daly nevertheless acknowledges that 
there must be a difference between belief and the fictionalist attitude 
and cites Rosen and Burgess (2005) to this effect. Daly responds that 
such a difference is plain for all to see: the person who adopted the 
fictionalist attitude to P would typically say that he does not believe 
P, for example. This ushers in a discussion of Horwich (1991) who 
claims that such professions of disbelief are merely expressions of 
mistaken self-attribution on the fictionalist’s part. Daly’s response 
is three-pronged, as follows. First, this puts the fictionalist in a no-
win situation. Second, Horwich contradicts his own views on truth. 
Third, under the heading ‘Aren’t we all jobbing fictionalists?’ Daly 
advances the master-argument: we all admit there is a fictionalist 
attitude, so that is the attitude that the fictionalist is talking about. 
As Daly is aware, Horwich anticipates this move and draws the dis-
tinction between local and global fictionalism, objecting only to the 
latter. Daly makes two points to counter this. First, he offers a coun-
terexample: the intentional stance towards chess-playing computers. 
He takes such an intentional stance to provide us with an example of 
global fictionalism. Secondly, Daly charges that Horwich is guilty of 
ignoratio elenchi. “What is at issue?” Daly asks, and answers that it is 
whether there is a distinction between believing a sentence and ex-
ploiting it. According to Daly, even qualified, local fictionalism gives 
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us a reason to accept that there is such a distinction. Daly concludes 
the relevant part of the paper with brief remarks on Blackburn and 
Teller, with which I will not concern myself here, since they do not 
add much to the substantive points made earlier.
The problem with Daly’s treatment is threefold. First, his presen-
tation of the fictionalist attitude as nondescript “exploiting” of prop-
ositions is overly broad and fails to acknowledge that it involves the 
use of the very same content the use of which can constitute belief. 
Second, he appears to misunderstand Horwich’s distinction between 
local and global fictionalism, construing it as a matter of the scope 
of the subject matter rather than of the scope of use of the relevant 
content. Third, his master argument presupposes a misunderstand-
ing of the role of paradigmatic cases along the lines I sketched earlier.
I will take up the issues in the order that helps better untangle 
them: (i) recap the doublethink charge in Horwich’s rendition; (ii) 
discuss why Daly’s characterization of fictionalist acceptance is inad-
equate; (iii) dismiss Daly’s charge that Horwich contradicts his own 
views on truth; (iv) discuss what is at issue, and what I think Hor-
wich was getting at with the local vs. global fictionalism distinction, 
and hence why Daly’s counterexample misses the point. I will then 
(v) offer my own critique of Horwich’s conception (or presentation) 
of the distinction between serious and nonserious acceptance and 
propose a better way to think about it; (vi) show how the charge 
of doublethink can be supported by this conception of the distinc-
tion; (vii) revisit, in light of the above, Daly’s “readily forthcoming 
behavioral difference” between the fictionalist and the realist. I will 
put (v)-(vii) into a separate section since the bulk of it is not a direct 
critique of Daly.
2 Doublethink charge as advanced by Horwich
The discussion of Horwich 1991 is the centerpiece of Daly’s argu-
ment, as Horwich offers the most sustained defense of the double-
think objection to fictionalism. Referring to fictionalism as ‘instru-
mentalism’, Horwich wrote:
I will try to show, not just that one should not follow [instrumental-
ism’s ultimate recommendation], but that one cannot. This is because it 
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presupposes a distinction between, on the one hand, believing a theory 
and, on the other hand, being disposed to use it, or, in van Fraassen’s 
terminology, merely accepting it. But there is no such distinction, or 
so I will argue. Believing a theory is nothing over and above the mental 
state responsible for using it; and so the attitude urged by instrumen-
talism is impossible. (Horwich 1991: 2)
The ‘what more do you want?’ theme, which we identified earlier, 
comes across very clearly. Horwich urges the reader to “…bear in 
mind what it is to accept a theory, and then try to say what more 
would be involved in believing it” (Horwich 1991: 3). This is backed 
up by the following remarks:
…when a theory is regarded instrumentally in normal scientific prac-
tice, it is always understood that its use is to be confined to a certain 
range of applications. It is understood that only predictions in a speci-
fied domain should be relied upon, and use of the theory in conjunc-
tion with other theories is also severely constrained…Thus, there is a 
crucial difference between the sort of acceptance involved in general, 
philosophical instrumentalism, and the attitude we have towards par-
ticular theories treated instrumentally for particular purposes. Con-
sequently, our familiarity with qualified, local instrumentalism gives 
us no reason to acknowledge the conceivability of unqualified, general 
instrumentalism. (Horwich 1991: 4-5)
Note the distinction between local and general instrumentalism at 
the end of the quoted passage; we shall take it up later. I will some-
times follow Horwich’s usage and call an acceptance ‘instrumental’ 
interchangeably with ‘nonserious’. I will say ‘fictionalist acceptance’ 
to refer to such (supposed) nonserious acceptance as satisfies the re-
quirements of fictionalism.
3 Fictionalist acceptance and beliefs in fictional truth
Daly uses the term ‘exploitation’ for the nonserious acceptance. I 
will do likewise when engaging with his text; however, I prefer ‘non-
serious acceptance’. ‘Exploitation’ is too broad. I think it is fair to 
say you exploit a sentence if you use it as a mnemonic device to re-
member the order of colors in the rainbow. But that is not the sense 
of ‘exploit’ that the fictionalist can adopt. The fictionalist has to use 
propositions of the theory as premises in arguments whose conclu-
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sions she will accept. In this sense she accepts or pretend-accepts the 
content of those propositions.
It is true that some fictionalists, starting with Field 1980, some-
times wrote as if they merely meant to replace accepting that P with 
accepting ‘In the fiction F, P’. However, this is not a tenable view. 
The difference has to be in the kind of acceptance, not in what one 
accepts. Some of the reasons why are spelled out in Yablo 2001 and 
lead him to conclude that “The fiction . . . functions as medium 
and not message.” (Yablo 2001: 76). (I take him to present the most 
thoughtful and clear version of fictionalism.) Even if it were a tenable 
view, the doublethink objection could still be pressed, but from a 
different angle, along the lines of the following. “What makes it the 
case that you accept the content that you say you accept, i.e., ‘In F, 
P’, rather than just P? You use the former in almost all the ways you 
would use the latter if you were a realist. Maybe ‘in F’ is just a kind 
of soothing mantra, devoid of genuine meaning? Maybe, in light of 
that, if you say ‘not-P’ you are a doublethinker.” Thus, the issue of 
attitudes is unavoidable. I suggest we proceed focusing on the clearer 
and better version of fictionalism and look for the difference in the 
attitude and not in the content.
Daly’s statement of fictionalism tends to obscure the fact that the 
fictionalist purports to adopt the fictionalist acceptance attitude to 
the relevant content. It thereby obscures the very source of the dou-
blethink objection. Daly states merely that the fictionalist does not 
believe that P but believes something else entirely, thus leaving the 
fictionalist acceptance out of the picture. No wonder then that the 
doublethink objection seems well-nigh nonsensical to him.
Being a fictionalist about mathematics, then, involves not believing 
sentences such as ‘7 + 5 = 12’. Instead, the mathematical fictionalist 
believes such sentences as ‘according to standard mathematics, 7 + 5 = 
12’, and ‘“7 + 5 = 12” is a useful sentence’. (Daly 2008: 424)
Notice ‘instead’. What follows it, however, is not what the fiction-
alist does instead. Those who believe that 7 + 5 = 12 typically also 
believe it to be useful and true according to standard mathematics. 
Clearly, ‘merely’ is omitted, but this is a trifling point. The impor-
tant point is that the fictionalist cannot make do with merely believing 
this sentence useful; she will need to be using it, e.g., as a premise 
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in scientific reasoning. One could try a detour, via (i) ‘using P as a 
premise would produce the correct result’ and (ii) ‘if P then Q’. From 
there you would go: (iii) ‘if I use P as a premise, the result would be 
Q and it would be correct’. And then you conclude: ‘therefore, Q’. I 
say that if you concluded so—if you got to Q—then you have used P. 
The burden of proof is on those who reject this.
We can see that this is indeed a misconception and not merely a 
misstatement on Daly’s part from his charge that Horwich equates 
the belief that P with the belief that ‘P’ is useful and thereby contra-
dicts his own views on the nature of truth6 (Daly 2008: 429). In fact, 
it is clear that Horwich claims that there is no difference between 
the belief that P and the (certain kind of) use of the proposition that P; 
in other words, that there is no difference between the belief that 
the theory is true and the use of that theory (i.e., the “unrestricted” 
use). The use of something is not the same as the belief that it is useful. 
(‘Use’ here need not mean anything physical or observable. It can 
be as mental as you like.) This misconception informs Daly’s other 
objections in subtler ways. I will not focus on this explicitly, letting 
it emerge instead.
4 What is at issue?
Consider another objection Daly puts forth.
…Horwich’s conclusion is an ignoratio elenchi. What’s at issue—and as 
Horwich originally presented the issue—is whether the fact that we 
use some theories for practical purposes without believing them is a 
reason ‘to think that belief and acceptance are distinct attitudes’. In 
other words, the issue isn’t whether qualified, local fictionalism gives 
reason to think that unqualified, general fictionalism is conceivable. 
The issue is whether even a qualified, local fictionalism gives reason to 
6 Here is the relevant passage: “The fictionalist distinguishes between: (1) 
Theory T is true; and (2) T is useful. According to the fictionalist, one can believe 
(2) without believing (1). Horwich disagrees. He claims that to believe (1) just 
is to believe (2), because ‘belief simply is acceptance’. They are the same belief 
state. Belief states are identical only if their contents are identical. So Horwich is 
committed to claiming that (1) expresses the same content as (2). That, however, 
is incompatible with Horwich’s (entirely plausible) rejection of the pragmatic 
conception of truth.” (Daly 2008: 429)
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think that there is a distinction between believing a sentence and ex-
ploiting it. And it surely does, because qualified, local fictionalism just 
is—as its name suggests—fictionalism about a localized and qualified 
subject matter. To be a fictionalist about a collection of sentences is to 
exploit, not to believe, the sentences in that collection. Unless there is 
a distinction between belief and exploitation, there can be no form of 
fictionalism whatsoever, including, a fortiori, a qualified, local fiction-
alism. (Daly 2008: 431-2)
There are two straw men set up here. One is misconstrued Horwich, 
who by ‘local fictionalism’ means ‘fictionalism about a localized and 
qualified subject matter’. It is clear that for actual Horwich it is, rath-
er, the use that is supposed to be “local”, as opposed to “global”, in 
order to constitute nonserious acceptance, i.e., such use is supposed 
to be somehow bounded or circumscribed. This idea is not as clear 
as one might wish, but that should not lead us to adopt Daly’s con-
strual, which leads him to offer as a counterexample the pervasive 
intentional stance we adopt to chess-playing computers. (Daly 2008: 
431). We certainly do not treat a personal computer in all respects, in 
all contexts, as more than a mere machine—think of the computers 
waiting by the curb for trash collection. As I understand Horwich’s 
idea, such cases would suffice to show that the use of ‘Computer is 
a person’ is confined, bounded, and that its interaction with other 
theories (such as our emergency preparedness plans) is restricted.
The second straw man apparently denies that there is any distinc-
tion between serious and nonserious acceptance at all. Such a view is 
absurd: surely, there are plenty of entirely uncontroversial cases of 
nonserious acceptance. Every time we play a game or assume some-
thing provisionally we have a nonserious acceptance. Daly thinks he 
finds therein an easy proof that the distinction between belief and 
exploitation is well-grounded and that, therefore, Horwich’s con-
cerns are misplaced. His proof comes to this: “Pretty much everyone 
should admit the distinction because pretty much everyone draws it” 
(430). Daly elaborates:
There are many things you exploit without believing them. You ex-
ploit a computer’s wanting to get its king’s bishop out early, or the 
sun’s rising, or electricity’s flowing along cables, and yet you believe 
none of these things. Again, it’s common practice in science to exploit 
talk of frictionless planes, perfectly inelastic bodies, and the like with-
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out believing that talk. So mustn’t the distinction between belief and 
exploitation be well-grounded since we frequently and more or less 
consciously draw it in our own cognitive lives? Aren’t we all jobbing 
fictionalists? (Daly 2008: 431)
What is really at issue is whether the acceptance attitude toward the 
relevant range of cases, e.g., the mathematical, which meets the fiction-
alist requirements, could count as nonserious. As discussed, the central 
question here is whether there is any kind of more complete or ro-
bust acceptance for such contents. The sense in which the clear cases 
show that the distinction is well-grounded is just that: in those cases 
it is not a distinction without a difference, but rather there is some-
thing that constitutes the difference.
Perhaps one thinks, “Let me focus on what I do mentally when I 
pretend there are frictionless planes, and let me do the same with the 
proposition that there are numbers. That will be my instrumental-
ist acceptance of that proposition. Now, to illustrate the contrast, 
let me focus on what I do when I believe there is a table in front of 
me. If I adopt the same attitude to the existence of numbers, then 
I would surely have a different—non-instrumentalist—acceptance of 
their existence.”
This might work if attitudes were sui generis feelings. But if the 
distinction between the fictional and the serious acceptance is along 
the lines of partial/complete, as suggested by Horwich, then, as we 
saw, the ‘same’ is open to different readings. One would have to 
know which sameness to aim at: sameness with regard to complete-
ness or sameness with regard to the constituent dispositions to use. 
If the dispositions involved in the provisional acceptance of friction-
less planes constitute the minimum required to “do the work” that 
the fictionalist needs done in the case of numbers, then one is bound 
to fail in an attempt at an incomplete acceptance of numbers within 
those constraints. Likewise, one might be bound to fail in an at-
tempt to have the very same set of dispositions with regard to the 
number-content as with regard to the table-content, simply because 
the former might not lend itself to all the same kinds of use as the lat-
ter. In other words, one might only be able to succeed in an attempt 
that would bring about the acceptance (of numbers) that is the same 
as the acceptance of frictionless planes in the sense of the constituent 
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dispositions and the same as the acceptance of tables in the sense of 
completeness. Thus, though in each case one would succeed in an 
attempt, the attempts would not result in two non-identical attitudes 
to the target content.
III
1 Horwich’s analysis
I noted that Horwich’s idea that nonserious acceptance is somehow 
incomplete is not very clear. He has to share some of the blame if 
Daly misconstrues him. We find more difficulties with the account 
on closer inspection. It seems ‘restricted’ use should not be taken 
to mean ‘narrow’. After all, ‘narrow’ is a matter of degree, whereas 
accepting instrumentally is not supposed to be. If we set aside any 
suggestion of narrowness, a deeper problem emerges. Suppose you 
believe that not-P and are working on a task for the purposes of which 
you instrumentally accept that P. Your acceptance that P, ex hypothesi, 
is “restricted” to that task. But you do not cease to believe that not-
P even as you use P for the purposes at hand. Somehow you accept 
not-P contemporaneously. If you do not, your acceptance of not-P is 
restricted, and hence instrumental. So, either you accept both P and 
not-P, which prima facie does not look good, or you accept neither, 
which is contrary to the supposition that you accept P. (I do not find 
any help in the idea of simply adding awareness, which may be sug-
gested by Horwich’s phrase ‘understood to be restricted’ [my italics].)
2 Towards a better understanding of the distinction
When you accept something provisionally, in a game, or as a sim-
plifying assumption, your beliefs continue to operate “in the back-
ground”. You try to make sure you do not rely on the instrumentally 
accepted in ways you did not intend, and such monitoring is done 
through beliefs. This suggests a two-tier picture of acceptances, with 
instrumental acceptance working against the background of belief. 
Trying to articulate this intuitive picture appears to be the only way 
forward.
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We need a way to understand the distinction between the “back-
ground” and the “foreground” if we want to say that we continue to 
accept what we believe “in the background”. A first thought might 
be that the background acceptance is constituted by counterfactu-
als: if I accept something nonseriously, then there are some other 
circumstances where I would not accept it, even though they would 
not change my evidential base. However, this is clearly inadequate, 
because, equally, if I seriously accepted that P, there may well be 
some circumstances where I would cease to accept it (and accept not-
P instead): the circumstances which would trigger the adoption of a 
nonserious attitude. We need to make this asymmetrical: only some 
counterfactuals should count.
Our intuitions about whether someone is serious (or sincere) in 
holding a belief (or another attitude) seem to be informed by our 
beliefs about how that person would behave in certain specific situ-
ations, that appear to us as “probative” for a given attitude (taken 
with its object). “Does she only pretend to love him?—Would she 
continue to act as if she does if he did not have any money?” “Does 
he only pretend that the computer is a person?—Would he show any 
concern for it if fire broke out in the house?—Well, maybe he does 
not show any concern for human persons either?—Then maybe there 
is no matter of fact as to whether he really believes the computer is 
a person.” Such intuitions are far from capturing the full complexity 
and all the nuances of our thinking about our real-life attitudes. They 
ignore our being compartmentalized and conflicted. Nevertheless, 
they might capture as much as is clear in the concept itself and serve 
well enough for our rather narrow focus on fictionalism and the 
doublethink charge. A scientist who habitually works on scientific 
problems assuming frictionless planes would nevertheless reintro-
duce friction into the model if she realized that the problem requires 
a greater degree of precision. We can suppose this to be partially and 
defeasibly constitutive of the nonserious attitude in this case (count-
ing situations requiring greater degree of precision as probative for 
such content). In other words, we can suppose that there is a set 
of counterfactuals of this kind, such that a sufficient proportion of 
them holding true is constitutive of nonseriousness of acceptance of 
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a given content, while not each individual one is necessary.7 The set 
of probative circumstances will, obviously, depend on the specific 
content of the attitude in question. The prima facie difficulty is that 
the subject’s desires and values, as well as her other beliefs, must 
also be seen as parameters that determine that probative set. Does 
reference to other beliefs amount to an objectionable circularity? It 
need not if there is a sufficient range of cases that are not in question. 
You need not expect always to find yourself in a situation where in 
order to show that the subject’s acceptance that P is serious you have 
to show her acceptance that Q is serious and vice versa. And if you 
were to find that to be the case, your intuitions about seriousness 
would falter.
3 Contrast collapse
This analysis of the distinction would support the doublethink charge 
if one found oneself at a loss to think of probative situations show-
ing that what is alleged to be instrumentally accepted is not “really” 
accepted.
What would be a situation where the use of mathematics would 
count towards its acceptance “in earnest”? I do not wish to suggest 
that our serious concerns are all of the gross down-to-earth kind. One 
cares also about Truth. We know of many people who made great sac-
rifices for what they saw as the truth, and we certainly think they 
were serious. Nevertheless, in such circumstances we would attri-
bute belief even if we could not make any sense of its content. Thus, 
it could be that the attribution is purely deferential, where we simply 
go along with the person’s self-attribution, just as an attribution of 
content could be purely deferential in certain cases. Furthermore, 
even under the most favorable assumptions, bravely standing up for 
the truth is at best a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition of be-
lief. Adhering to a philosophical view ought to be compatible with 
fairly modest degrees of fortitude. Thus, the fact that we attribute 
seriousness in such cases does not show that we understand what it is 
to be serious and so does not put to rest the concerns animating the 
7 It could be a bit more complicated, with different individual counterfactuals 
having different weight. In that case read ‘proportion’ accordingly.
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doublethink charge against fictionalism.
Why not simply say with Daly the following?
If a behavioural difference is wanted, then it is readily forthcoming. 
Someone who believes theory T will typically say, ‘I believe that T; I 
don’t only believe that T is useful’. By contrast, someone who exploits 
T will typically say, ‘I don’t believe T; I believe only that it is useful’. 
(Daly 2008: 428)8
This statement seems again to evince Daly’s tendency to conflate the 
belief in usefulness of a theory with its actual use. If we set this aside, 
we might read this as advising to look at self-attribution. I assume 
that one would be unwilling to make object-level avowals presuppos-
ing the existence of numbers in very same contexts where one likes 
to assert that one does not believe in numbers. The alternative is to 
suppose that fictionalism might have its sole expression in an odd dis-
position to make pronouncements in the form of Moore’s Paradox. 
It is hard to see how such a disposition could reassure us if we sus-
pected the fictionalist of doublethink. Any suggestion to this effect 
one could get from the quoted passage should be set aside, I think.
Still, looking at the object-level avowals, why not simply say that 
one who accepts mathematics seriously would be disposed to freely 
acknowledge the existence of numbers in certain circumstances: 
perhaps, at leisure, on reflection, etc., whereas one who accepts it 
nonseriously would not? The problem with this idea is that both the 
fictionalist and the platonist would on many occasions find them-
selves saying the very same things: that there are infinitely many 
primes, etc. We would need somehow to mark off the avowals that 
are made seriously in order to distinguish the fictionalist from the pla-
tonist. (Clearly, we cannot simply say “if one is serious”, nor “if one 
takes oneself to be serious”, as that would beg the question.) It will 
not do to say the subject must be focused and thinking hard, because 
a fictionalist might be thinking hard about a mathematical problem, 
8 This passage is Daly’s rejoinder to Rosen and Burgess (2005: 536). Unfor-
tunately, they seem to share Daly’s idea about the significance of self-attribution, 
as they grant that if scientists were indeed given to frequent verbalizations of the 
kind Daly suggests, then the doublethink objection would have less merit. I dis-
agree with that, for reasons stated. If disavowals could do the trick, it would be of 
no consequence whether philosophers or scientists performed them, in my view.
Inga Nayding22
thus presupposing the existence of numbers for the purposes at hand. 
It will not do to go the opposite way and say that the subject must be 
relaxed and not troubled by any immediate mathematical concern: 
the subject might nevertheless be in a state where the mathematical 
make-believe is dispositionally operative. (A fictionalist is lying in a 
hammock under a palm tree, pondering the starry sky above and the 
moral law within, when she hears, “I wonder how many primes there 
are?” She might not be disposed to challenge the presuppositions and 
might well respond, “Infinitely many”.) The subject needs to be en-
gaged not simply “in reflection”, but “in reflection on what there is”.
Herein lies the problem. What constitutes a true instance of re-
flection on what there is—as opposed to reflection on what there is 
fictionally? We could say: in the former we set aside any presupposi-
tions. But to set aside all presuppositions just is to be serious.9 Then 
we are back to the question of what constitutes being serious. Fur-
thermore, the thought that there is a cognitive activity of “reflection 
on what there is” distinct from ordinary theory choice runs counter 
to the Quinean understanding of ontology that underlies indispens-
ability arguments, the raison d’être of fictionalism. Of course, one 
might be engaged in a cognitive activity that one thinks of as such 
reflection, as peering into the fabric of reality, but this being an illu-
sion, the avowals made on such occasions, contradicting the avowals 
made in more practical contexts, would be instances of doublethink. 
Daly complains that the fictionalist is placed in a “no-win situa-
tion”: no matter what he says, “[i]t is claimed that [he] is in the same 
psychological state as the believer—namely, that of belief—and it is 
just that [he] is in the grip of a delusive theory and so misreports his 
belief as something other than a belief” (Daly 2008: 429). Thus, “It 
transpires that nothing would be interpreted [. . .] as evidence for 
someone’s being a fictionalist” (Daly 2008: 429). This complaint is 
not to the point, because we are not talking about evidence. Rather, 
we are trying to understand what it is for someone to accept math-
ematics instrumentally. We are trying to understand how the sup-
posed state of instrumental acceptance, as invoked by the fictionalist, 
9 I am not saying that we would ordinarily only call someone serious only if 
he literally set aside all presuppositions. This is contextual, cf. ‘Knowing that P is 
excluding all possibilities that not-P’.
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differs from the non-instrumental acceptance of the same content. 
We cannot take the fictionalists at their word if we do not under-
stand what they are saying. We can, of course, assess that a person is 
sincere even if we do not understand, but being sincere does not keep 
one from being confused or from invoking a distinction without a 
difference.
I conclude that Daly’s discussion does not offer anything that 
could allow the fictionalists to dismiss the suspicion that the nonseri-
ous acceptance they are proposing cannot be contrasted with serious 
acceptance of the same content. If indeed it cannot be, there remains 
a separate question whether anything like the norms that apply to 
empirical belief apply to acceptance in such cases. If they do not, 
one could enjoy ontological freedom without the ability to claim an 
austere ontology.10
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